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Abstract 
The late Harold Berman was a pioneering scholar of Soviet law, legal history, 
jurisprudence, and law and religion; he is best known today for his monumental Law 
and Revolution series on the Western legal tradition. In the early 1960s, Berman wrote 
a short book, Law and Language, which was only recently discovered and published in 
2013. In this early text, he adumbrated many of the main themes of his later work, 
including Law and Revolution. He also anticipated a good deal of the interdisciplinary 
and comparative methodology that we take for granted today, even though it was rare in 
the intense legal positivist era during which he was writing. This Article contextualizes 
Berman’s Law and Language within the development of his own legal thought and in the 
evolution of interdisciplinary legal studies. It focuses particularly on the themes of law 
and religion, law and history, and law and communication that dominated Berman’s 
writing until his death in 2007. 
Keywords: Harold J. Berman; law and language; legal history; legal positivism; 
interdisciplinary legal studies; Cold War; Soviet Union; law and religion; rhetoric; legal 
anthropology; ritual; courtroom 
 
 
“I should like to revive and revitalize historical jurisprudence, and I think the way 
to do it is with linguistic jurisprudence.  History is group memory. Language is the record 
 
1 Jonas Robitscher Professor of Law, Alonzo L. McDonald Distinguished Professor, and Director of the 
Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University.  B.A. Calvin College (1982); J.D. Harvard 
Law School (1985).  This Article is largely drawn from our “Introduction,” to Harold J. Berman, Law and 
Language: The Effective Symbols of Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1–35, 
and is used herein with permission of the publisher.  
2 JD/MTS Candidate and Savage-Lebey Scholar, Emory University.  B.A. Wheaton College (2010).   
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of history. Speech is the recording of the remembered past, and the envisioned future.  I 
shall no doubt be scorned or ignored for the identification of history, speech, and law….  
But not in all quarters.  More and more people are now ready for this message.”  
          -- Harold J. Berman (1966)3 
“Harold Berman is a giant, whose work defies the banalities of the age and 
allows us to take their measure.  In a scholarly world drifting toward the particularistic 
exploration of ‘unique’ contexts, Berman points in a different direction—toward holistic 
descriptions of entire systems of legal thought.... Berman’s work, and especially his Law 
and Revolution, will endure when almost everything is forgotten.  He is the only 
American who might be paired with Max Weber in the depth of his historical and 
comparative understanding of the remarkable character of legal modernity.”      
       -- Guido Calabresi, Dean, Yale Law School (1996) 4 
 
Introduction 
“I need to get back to that book.  It’s just sitting there gathering dust.  I just can’t 
find the time.”  That was Harold J. Berman in September, 1982.  We were sitting in his 
office at Harvard Law School, where I was getting my next assignment as his research 
assistant.  The book manuscript in question was entitled “Law and Language: Effective 
Symbols of Community.”  Berman had completed a partial first draft of the book in 1964, 
but he just could not finish it.  He had been writing and lecturing feverishly in the interim 
on Soviet law, international trade, legal philosophy, and legal history, and was always 
fighting deadlines.  I asked him if he wanted me to take a crack at the “Law and 
Language” manuscript.  “No, no, we have other things to do,” he replied memorably.  
“We have the Reformation to conquer!”  Then he handed me the first of many research 
assignments on the influence of the Protestant “revolutions” on the Western legal 
tradition—a topic that absorbed both of us for the next quarter century.5   
Berman never did find the time to get back to the “Law and Language” 
manuscript, and I never got the chance to work on it either—until recently.  After we 
moved from Harvard Law School to Emory Law School in 1985, the manuscript 
disappeared, somehow lost in transit.  We looked for it a few times, but he eventually 
gave up.  He had many more books and articles to write, many more deadlines to fight, 
and of course “the Reformation to conquer.”   
 
3 Excerpts from Letter to his Dartmouth College mentor, Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (May 28, 1966) (on 
file in the Emory Law Library Archives), see below, note 15. 
4 Jacket Endorsement for Howard O. Hunter, ed., The Integrative Jurisprudence of Harold J. Berman 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996).  Dean Calabresi by this point had been appointed to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  
5 When using the “first person” voice herein, the author is John Witte.  
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When he died in 2007, I became Berman’s literary executor, and spent many 
pleasant months digging through the veritable mountains of papers he left.  Only near 
the end of that literary excavation did I come upon his old manuscript on “Law and 
Language.”  It was sitting in a rusty old filing cabinet in his unheated garage, buried 
under some old rags and newspapers.  Mold, mildew and mice had all done their best to 
be sure the manuscript would never be found.  But there it was, still readable, and still 
unfinished. 
It has been a special privilege to be able to finish my late great mentor’s old book 
and to publish it in a modern critical edition, just out with Cambridge University Press.6  
The book is a creature of its time and place—America in the 1960s.  It reflects concerns 
over the Cold War, the violent student protests and union strikes, the rise of Marxism in 
the academy and McCarthyism in Congress.  It talks easily of the gradual senescence 
of legal realism and legal positivism, and prophesizes grandly about the rise of world 
law and a new interdisciplinary legal studies movement.  But the book is also a timeless 
statement about the intricacies of legal translation, transmission, and transplantation 
over time and the essential role and power of law and legal language in building culture 
and community both locally and globally.  It’s written in a buoyant and accessible style, 
which typifies a lot of Berman’s writing, especially in this period of his career.  Its main 
themes and recommendations about law and language are as relevant in our day as 
they were half a century ago when Berman wrote them—even if we now have fancier 
tools and terms of comparative hermeneutics, literary theory, legal philology and 
semiotics to describe them.  
The book is not just an important lost artifact in the development of the field of 
“law and language” studies.  It is also a wonderful prequel to Berman’s monumental 
Law and Revolution series and his other books in legal history, legal philosophy, and 
law and religion.  Law and Language outlines his theory of law and revolution in the 
Western legal tradition, his devotion to integrative jurisprudence and interdisciplinary 
legal studies, his call for deeper comparative legal studies and East-West 
rapproachment, and more.  Law and Language also mines some of the deep religious 
sources and dimensions of historical and modern legal systems -- themes which would 
occupy him more fully in his famous title published ten years later: The Interaction of 
Law and Religion.7  
In this Article, drawn largely from our Introduction to the work, we set Law and 
Language in the context of Berman’s own evolving legal thought and in the contours of 
the emerging field of comparative and interdisciplinary legal study.  It is especially apt to 
have this Article appear in this inaugural edition of the Journal of Law and Religion as a 
product of our Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory and as a publication 
 
6 Harold J. Berman, Law and Language: Effective Symbols of Community, ed. John Witte, Jr. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
7 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1974), partly reprinted and revised in Faith and Order: The 
Reconciliation of Law and Religion (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1993). 
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of Cambridge University Press.  Berman was one of the founders of the Journal when it 
was launched in 1982, and he contributed the very first article to volume 1.  Berman 
was also one of the founders of our Law and Religion Center at Emory University, along 
with Frank Alexander, another one of his former Harvard Law School students.  We 
have come full circle. 
Berman’s Biography 
Harold J. Berman was one of the great polymaths of American legal education, 
and taught for sixty years before his death in 2007.  Born and raised in a conservative 
Jewish family and community in Hartford, Connecticut, Berman went to Dartmouth 
College where he came under the inspiration of the great German intellectual, Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy, whose work would have a life-long influence on him. He completed 
his LL.B. and M.A. in History at Yale, but was interrupted by military service in World 
War II from 1942 to 1945, where he served as a cryptographer, breaking Russian code 
for the Allied Forces in Europe.  He began his teaching career at Stanford Law School 
in 1947, but the following year moved to Harvard Law School, where taught until 1985.  
At Harvard, he first served as the Joseph Story Professor of Law and Legal History, 
then as the James Barr Ames Professor of Law.  He also served as Founder and 
Director of Harvard Law School’s Liberal Arts Fellowship Program in Law, Fellow of the 
Russian Research Center of Harvard University, and Member of the Legal Committee of 
the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council.   
From 1985 to 2007, Berman taught at Emory Law School, serving as the first 
Robert W. Woodruff Professor of Law, a university professorship.  He was also a Fellow 
in The Carter Center at Emory University, Founding Director of the American Law 
Center in Moscow, Founding Director of the World Law Institute at Emory Law School, 
and Senior Fellow of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University.   
In the first three decades of his career, Berman’s scholarly energies were 
focused on the Soviet legal system and the law of international trade.  He developed 
several new courses, testified frequently before courts, commissions, and 
Congressional committees, and traveled regularly to Europe and the Soviet Union—55 
times to Russia alone.  He spent the 1961–62 academic year at the Moscow Institute of 
State and Law, where he encountered, among others, a rising young star named 
Mikhail Gorbachev.8  In the spring of 1982, he served as Fulbright Professor at Moscow 
 
8 True story: It was the winter of 1982, with Brezhnev still in power in the USSR.  The Bermans had me 
over for dinner.  After a few rounds of drinks, Berman stood up and announced grandly: “I have a 
prophecy to make. I predict that, in a decade, the Soviet Union will be revolutionized, and the leader of 
the revolution will be a young man, I have been watching for a long time—Mikhail Gorbachev.”  Within a 
decade, glasnost, perestroika, and demokratizatsiia had become the watchwords of a new Russian 
revolution.  See later Harold J. Berman, “Book Review of Mikhail Gorbachev, PERESTROIKA:  New 
Thinking for Our Country and the World (1987),” The Atlanta Constitution (December 13, 1987): 12J; id., 
“Gorbachev's Law Reforms in Historical Perspective,” Emory Journal of International Affairs 5 (Spring, 
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State University.  He produced a massive body of new writing in this early period.  Of 
these writings, his Justice in the U.S.S.R. (1950; rev. ed. 1963)9 will long endure as a 
classic, as will several of his lengthy law review articles on the lex mercatoria.10  Also 
important publications in this period, for purposes of his study of law and language, 
were his exquisite translations of sundry Soviet laws—nearly 2800 printed pages in 
English translation.11 
In the first three decades of his career, Berman also developed a keen interest in 
bringing legal education into the undergraduate college—a different exercise in 
translation, now of professional legal language, concepts, and methods into something 
accessible to young students of the social, humane, and exact sciences.  These 
pedagogical interests he distilled in two other signature titles, On the Teaching of Law in 
the Liberal Arts Curriculum (1956)12 and The Nature and Functions of Law (1958; 6th 
ed., 2004),13 the latter a standard text in American college courses on law.  He 
extended this interest further in arranging a multi-lingual series of Talks on American 
Law, which started as Voice of America broadcasts.  Here was yet another early 
example of legal translation and transmission—making the intricacies of American 
public, private, penal, and procedural law accessible to radio audiences throughout the 
Americas, Europe, Africa, Asia, Australia, the Middle East, and even the Soviet bloc 
countries.14 
 
1988): 1–10; id., “The Challenge of Christianity and Democracy in the Soviet Union,” in Christianity and 
Democracy in Global Context, ed. John Witte, Jr. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 287–96.  
9 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1950, 1963) and (New York: Random House, 1963). 
10 Harold J. Berman, “The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies: The 
Soviet-American Example,” Law and Contemporary Problems 24 (Summer 1959): 482–528; Harold J. 
Berman and George L. Bustin, “The Soviet System of Foreign Trade,” in Business Transactions with the 
USSR, The Legal Issues, ed. Robert Starr (Chicago: ABA Press, 1975), 25–75; Harold J. Berman,  
“The Law of International Commercial Transactions (Lex Mercatoria),” Emory Journal of International 
Dispute Resolution 2 (Spring 1988): 235–310. 
11 Harold J. Berman and James W. Spindler, trans. and eds., Soviet Criminal Law and Procedure: The 
RSFSR Codes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966); Harold J. Berman and Peter B. Maggs, 
trans. and ed., Disarmament Inspection Under Soviet Law (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 
1967); Harold J. Berman and John B. Quigley, trans. and eds., Basic Laws on the Structure of the Soviet 
State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Harold J. Berman, ed. and trans., Soviet 
Statutes and Decisions, A Journal of Translations I–V (Fall, 1964–Spring-Summer 1969). [This is correct, 
as it conforms with the archived copies of this journal on Hein; I reviewed the L&L introduction, and it was 
cited like this as well.] 
12 (Brooklyn, NY: Foundation Press, 1956). 
13 (Brooklyn, NY: Foundation Press, 1958); with William R. Greiner and Samir N. Saliba, 6th rev. ed., 
(New York: Foundation Press, 2004). 
14 Harold J. Berman, ed., Talks on American Law (New York: Random House, 1961); Portuguese 
translation published in Rio de Janeiro, 1963; Arabic translation published in Cairo, 1964; French 
translation published in Paris, 1965; Spanish translation published in Chile and Mexico, 1965; 




In the last three decades of his career—with Law and Language coming right at 
the transition point in his scholarly focus and thinking—Berman expanded his legal 
scholarship to include legal philosophy, legal history, and law and religion.  He produced 
a series of path-breaking volumes, most notably The Interaction of Law and Religion 
(1974),15 Faith and Order: The Reconciliation of Law and Religion (1993),16 and his 
massive Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983)17 
and Law and Revolution II: The Impact of the Protestant Reformations on the Western 
Legal Tradition (2003).18 The final volume of this series—on the American, French, and 
Russian revolutions—was on his writing desk when he died, along with a dozen articles 
in progress.   
Berman left a scholarly legacy of 25 books and 458 articles, book chapters, and 
book reviews.  These writings were collectively published in 21 languages; a few of his 
books are still being translated, and his new book on Law and Language will deserve 
translation, too.  A comprehensive collection of his writings and some of his 
correspondence from 1948 to 1985 are included in the “Red Set” of faculty publications 
in the Harvard Law Library.19  Digital and hard copies of all his (published and 
unpublished) non-book writings from 1938 to 2007 are available through the Emory 
University libraries.20  His work continues to be mined and cited with alacrity in the main 
fields that he worked.  This new book on Law and Language will provide a further 
window, if not gateway, into his writings and the development of his legal thought. 
Berman taught some 8000 law students at Harvard and Emory, more than 300 of 
whom have become professors, in at least 33 countries.  His students and colleagues 
honored him with three Festschriften,21 and three law journal symposia are dedicated to 
his work.22  He was a member of both the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and 
the Russian Academy of Sciences.  He received more than a hundred prizes and 
awards for his scholarly achievements, including the prestigious Scribes Award from the 
 
15 (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1974). 
16 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1993; repr. ed., Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1996). 
17 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
18 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). 
19 Harvard Law School Library, Collections, The Red Set, (accessed January 1, 2013), 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/library/special/collections/red_set/index.html 
20 Emory Libraries, EmoryFindingAids, Harold J. Berman Papers,1938–2007, (accessed January 1, 
2013), http://findingaids.library.emory.edu/documents/L-027/; Zotero, Harold J. Berman Collection, 
(accessed January 1, 2013), https://www.zotero.org/harold_j_berman/items. 
21 John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., The Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and 
Religion in Tribute to Harold J. Berman (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1988); William E. Butler, Peter B. 
Maggs, and John B. Quigley, Jr., eds., Law after Revolution: Essays on Socialist Law in Honor of Harold 
J. Berman (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Press, 1988); and Hunter, ed., The Integrative Jurisprudence of 
Harold J. Berman. 
22 “A Conference on the Work of Harold J. Berman,” Emory Law Journal 42 (1993): 419–589; “The 
Foundations of Law,” Emory Law Journal 54 (2005): 1–376; “In Praise of a Legal Polymath: A Special 




American Bar Association, and honorary doctorates from the Catholic University of 
America, the Virginia Theological Seminary, the University of Ghent, and the Russian 
Academy of Sciences.  The newly dedicated Harold J. Berman Library in the Center for 
the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University houses some of his personal books 
and effects. The Harold J. Berman Lecture Series at Emory Law School offers regular 
lectures on the many legal topics that Berman long championed.  
 
Berman’s Main Scholarly Themes 
Throughout his long career, Berman had the remarkable ability to think above, 
beyond, and against his times.  In the 1950s and ‘60s, the dominant Cold War logic 
taught that the Soviet Union was a lawless autocracy.  Berman argued to the contrary 
that the Russians would always honor contracts and treaties that were fairly 
negotiated.23  His views prevailed and came to inform various nuclear treaties, trade 
agreements, and East-West accords.  In the 1970s and 1980s, the conventional belief 
persisted that the Middle Ages were the dark ages as the West waited impatiently for 
Enlightenment and modernization.  Berman argued the contrary, that the medieval era 
was the first modern age of the West and the founding era of our Western legal 
tradition.24 This view is now standard lore.  In the 1980s and 1990s, jurists fought 
fiercely over whether legal positivism or natural law or some other perspective was the 
better legal philosophy.  Berman called for an integrative jurisprudence that reconciled 
these views with each other and with other perspectives on law, particularly historical 
jurisprudence.25  This view now prevails in a world dedicated to interdisciplinary legal 
study.  And, in the 2000s, with the world hell-bent on waging “a clash of civilizations,”26 
 
23 See sources above, note 10.  [Correct] See further Harold J. Berman, “The Challenge of Soviet Law,” 
Harvard Law Review 62 (December 1948 and January 1949): 220–65, 449–66; id., “The Law of the 
Soviet State,” Soviet Studies 6 (January 1955): 225–37; id., “Suggestions for Future U.S. Policy on 
Communist Trade,” Export Trade and Shipper 35 (July 16, 1956): 11–12; id., “Negotiating Commercial 
Transactions with Soviet Customers,” Aspects of East-West Trade, American Management Association 
Report No. 45 (1960), 68–75; id., “The Dilemma of Soviet Law Reform,” Harvard Law Review 76 (March 
1963): 929–51; id., “Law in American Democracy and Under Soviet Communism,” New Hampshire Bar 
Journal 5(3) (April 1963): 105–13; id., “Soviet Law Reform and its Significance for Soviet International 
Relations,” in Law, Foreign Policy and the East-West Detente, ed. Edward McWhinney (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1964), 3–17; id., “Law as an Instrument of Peace in U.S.-Soviet Relations,” 
Stanford Law Review 22 (1970): 943–62.  
24 This is the central thesis of his Law and Revolution series.   
25 See esp. Harold J. Berman, “Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence:  Politics, Morality, History,” 
California Law Review 76 (1988): 779–801; and elaboration in id., Faith and Order, 239–310. See 
analysis in Peter Teachout, “‘Complete Achievement’: Integrity of Vision and Performance in Berman’s 
Jurisprudence,” in Hunter, ed., The Integrative Jurisprudence of Harold J. Berman, 75–98.  Already in his 
1958 edition of The Nature and Functions of Law, 25ff., Berman had formed his basic, three-part 
analytical framework for jurisprudence, combining natural law, legal positivism, and historical 
jurisprudence.  
26 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon 
& Schuster, 1996).  
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Berman called for a world law, grounded in global structures and processes, and 
universal customs and principles of peace, cooperation, and reconciliation.27  This view 
holds so much more promise than the jingoism and jihadism of the past decade and 
more.  
“First it was Russian law, then it was Western law, now it is world law.  What’s 
next, cosmic law?”  This is how Professor Berman’s beloved wife, Ruth, once 
summarized for me (with a blend of exasperation and astonishment) the stages of 
Berman’s storied and story-ed legal career.  There is keen insight in this statement.  For 
Berman, every legal system—even the budding legal system of the world—must 
ultimately be founded upon cosmic commandments and contemplation, divine examples 
and exemplars.  Berman has long prophesied that those legal systems that build on 
immanent and material foundations alone will fail.  The spectacular failure of the Soviet 
legal system in the later twentieth century was ample vindication of his insight into the 
essential religious foundations of law.   
Berman repeated this message in China, too, when in 2006, as a still energetic 
88-year old, he gave a series of lectures on law to packed houses in a dozen 
universities.  One of his Chinese respondents asked whether one needed to believe in 
God in order to have a just legal order. “It would certainly help!” Berman quipped 
immediately.  “But no,” he went on diplomatically: 
You don’t necessarily have to believe in God, but you have to 
believe in something.  You have to believe in law at least.  If 
you can’t accept God, then just focus on the law that God has 
written on all of our hearts.  Even children intuitively sense this 
law within us.  Every child in the world will say, “That’s my toy.” 
That’s property law.  Every child will say, “But you promised 
me.” That’s contract law.  Every child will say, “It’s not my fault. 
He hit me first.”  That’s tort law.  Every child will say, too, 
“Daddy said I could.” That’s constitutional law.  Law ultimately 
 
27 Harold J. Berman, “Law and Religion in the Development of a World Order,” Sociological Analysis:  A 
Journal in the Sociology of Religion 52 (Spring 1991): 27–36; id., “Law and Logos,” DePaul Law Review 
44 (Fall 1994): 143–65; id., “The Tri-Une God of History,” The Living Pulpit (April 1999): 18–19; id., “World 
Law in the New Millennium,” Twenty-First Century 52 (April 1999): 4–11 (in Chinese); id., “The God of 
History,” The Living Pulpit (July–September 2001): 27; id., “Integrative Jurisprudence and World Law,” in 
Manuel Atienza, et al., Rechtstheorie: Theorie des Rechts und der Gesellschaft: Festschrift für Werner 
Krawietz zum 70. Geburtstag (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 3–16; id., “The Holy Spirit: The God of 
History,” The Living Pulpit (April–June 2004): 32–33; id., “Faith and Law in a Multicultural World,” in Mark 
Juergensmeyer, ed., Religion in Global Civil Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 69–89; id., 




comes from our human nature, and our human nature is 
ultimately an image of God.28  
Such views reflect, in part, Berman’s life-long effort to integrate his religious faith 
with his legal learning.  In his chapel talks delivered in the Harvard Memorial Church 
over more than 30 years, Berman contrasted “the wisdom of the world” with “the 
wisdom of God.”  The wisdom of the world, he declared, “assumes that God’s existence 
is irrelevant to knowledge, and that truth is discoverable by the human mind unaided by 
the Spirit.” Jewish and Christian wisdom, by contrast, “seeks God’s guidance … in order 
to discover the relationship between what we know and what God intends for us.”  
Knowledge and intellect are “intimately connected with faith, with hope, and with love.” 
“God does not call us to be merely observers of life; rather he calls all of us—even the 
scholars in all that we do—to participate with him in the process of spiritual death and 
rebirth which is fundamental religious experience.”29 
Early on, Berman made clear that dialogue was essential to our relationships 
with God, neighbor, and self, and that language was an essential sinew of all our 
relationships.  God is a God of words, Berman believed, drawing on the Bible.  “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God,” reads 
John 1.  “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth,” Genesis 1 reads.  
And he did so by speech: “And God said, ‘Let there be…” is how each day of creation 
starts.  When it came to the creation of men and women, it was by dialogue, by 
conversation, first among the members of the Trinity, then between God and humanity: 
“Let us make man in our image, after our likeness,” the Trinitarian God says to its 
members.  And thereafter, God “walked and talked” with the man and the woman whom 
he created, though he talked with no other creature.  For Berman, humans, created in 
the image of God, are given the capacity for language and dialogue with each other and 
with God.30  In a 1969 sermon in Harvard’s Memorial Church he proclaimed: 
If we see Christianity as a dialogue which God has initiated 
with man, I think we can see that Christians are called to 
transform this dialogue into a dialogue also among men, in 
which we are brought into relationships with each other, so 
that we share common convictions, undertake common tasks, 
and recognize a common authority.… All life is a great 
 
28 This is based in part on my memory of a conversation with Professor Berman after his return from 
China.  These same sentiments are conveyed in a newspaper article about this trip. See Meredith Hobbs, 
“Translating Western Law into Chinese; Emory Professor Harold J. Berman Toured China, Speaking to 
Halls Packed with Chinese Students,” The Daily Report 117 (Fulton County, GA) (June 1, 2006): 1. 
29 Berman, Faith and Order, 319–22. 
30 Berman and I sometimes did devotions together, and I remember spending weeks discussing the 
meaning of these quoted statements, which in his view said a lot about the dialogical nature of God. 
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conversation, a discourse, a speaking together, which goes 
back to the very beginning, to God Himself.31 
Dialogue was key, in Berman’s view, to teaching and reaching reconciliation, and 
for building community both locally and globally.  Both Jewish and Christian theology, 
he reminded his church listeners, teach that persons must reconcile themselves to God, 
neighbor, and self.  For Berman, building on St. Paul, this meant that there can be “no 
real division between Jew and Gentile, slave and free, male and female”32—or, for that 
matter, black and white, straight and gay, old and young, rich and poor, citizen and 
sojourner.  For every sin that destroys our relationships, there must be grace that 
reconciles them.  For every Tower of Babel that divides our voices, there must be a 
Pentecost that unites them and makes them understandable to all.33  
Such spiritual sentiments could shackle the narrow-minded. They liberated 
Berman from conventional habits of mind and traditional divisions of knowledge.  He 
challenged Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Jeremy Bentham for their separation of fact and 
value, is and ought.34  He criticized Alexander Solzhenitsyn for his contradistinction of 
law and morals, law and love.35 He fought against the divisions of the very world itself 
into East and West, old and new, developed and undeveloped.  His favorite jurists were 
Gratian, Matthew Hale, and Joseph Story, who wrote concordances of discordant 
canons.36  His favorite philosophers were Peter Abelard, Philip Melanchthon, and 
Michael Polanyi, who developed integrative holistic philosophies.37 
“The era of dualism is waning,” Berman wrote in 1974.  “We are entering into a 
new age of integration and reconciliation.  Everywhere synthesis,” the overcoming of 
false opposites, is “the key to this new kind of thinking and living.”  Either-or must give 
way to both-and.  Not subject versus object, not fact versus value, not is versus ought, 
not soul versus body, not faith versus reason, not church versus state, not one versus 
 
31 See Berman, Law and Language, 161. 
32 Galatians 3:28; Ephesians 2:14–15; Colossians 3:10-11. See also John Witte, Jr., “A New 
Concordance of Discordant Canons: Harold J. Berman on Law and Religion,” Emory Law Journal 42 
(1993): 523–60, at 531. 
33 See sources in note 27,[Correct] and Tibor Várady’s Afterword, “From Babel to Pentecost,” in Law and 
Language, 163–85. [Correct] 
34 See Berman, Justice in the U.S.S.R., 15–24; id., Faith and Order, 239, 280; id., Law and Revolution, 
538, 546. For criticisms of Bentham, see Berman’s unpublished, “World Law and the Crisis of the 
Western Legal Tradition,” The William Timbers Lecture, Dartmouth College, Hanover, NH, April 21, 2005 
(on file in Emory Law School Library archives). [Ok] 
35 See Berman, Faith and Order, 314, 381. For similar criticisms of Emil Brunner, see Berman, Interaction, 
81–91. 
36 See Berman, Law and Revolution, 144–48; id., Law and Revolution II, 100–30; id., Faith and Order, 
170ff. 
37 See Berman, Law and Revolution, 132; id., Law and Revolution II, 77–80. 
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many, “but the whole person and whole community thinking and feeling, learning and 
living together”—that is the common calling of humankind, Berman wrote.38 
Berman applied this gospel of reconciliation and integration most vigorously to 
his legal studies.  He called for the reintegration of the classic schools of legal 
positivism, natural law theory, and historical jurisprudence—which, in his view, had 
been separated since God was cast out of the legal academy.  He called for the 
integration of public law and private law, of common law and civil law, of Western law 
and Eastern law into a global legal system.  He urged that law be given a place among 
the humanities and enrich itself with the ideas and methods of sundry humane 
disciplines.  He urged that legal language be cast in terms understandable to all, and be 
enriched by the power of poetry, liturgy, literature, and art.  And he urged most strongly 
that the subjects and sciences of law and religion be reconciled to each other.  Their 
separation was, for him, a theological “heresy” and a jurisprudential “fallacy” that cannot 
survive in the new era of synthesis and integration.  “[L]aw and religion stand or fall 
together,” he wrote.  “[I]f we wish law to stand, we shall have to give new life to the 
essentially religious commitments that give it its ritual, its tradition, and its authority—
just as we shall have to give new life to the social, and hence the legal, dimensions of 
religious faith.”39 
Berman’s talk of the death of dualism and the birth of an age of synthesis points 
to his further belief in a teleological, if not, providential view of history.  Both Jewish and 
Christian theology, he reminded his readers, teaches that time is continuous, not 
cyclical, that time moves forward from a sin-trampled garden to a golden city, from a 
fallen world to a perfect end time.  Berman was convinced that slowly but surely all the 
peoples of the world would come into contact with each other, and ultimately, after 
revolutionary struggle and even apocalyptic explosion, would seek finally to be 
reconciled with each other forever.40   
Berman’s grand account of evolution and revolution in Western history, set out in 
his Law and Revolution series, is rooted in this basic belief about the nature and pattern 
of time. There is a distinctive Western legal tradition, he argued, a continuity of legal 
ideas and institutions, which grow by accretion and adaptation.  The exact shape of 
these ideas and institutions is determined, in part, by the underlying religious belief 
systems of the people ruling and being ruled.  Six great revolutions, however, have 
punctuated this organic gradual development: the Papal Revolution of 1075, the 
German Lutheran Reformation of 1517, the English Puritan Revolution of 1640, the 
American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, and the Russian 
Revolution of 1917.  These revolutions were, in part, rebellions against a legal and 
political order that had become outmoded and ossified, arbitrary and abusive.  But, 
 
38 Berman, Interaction, 113; id., “Law and Religion in the Development of World Order,” 35. 
39 Berman, Faith and Order, 13. 
40 See Berman, Interaction, 119–20; id., Law and Revolution, 166–72. 
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more fundamentally, these revolutions were the products of radical shifts in the religious 
belief-systems of the people—shifts from Catholicism to Protestantism to Deism to the 
secular religion of Marxist-Leninism.  Each of these new belief-systems offered a new 
eschatology, a new apocalyptic vision of the perfect end-time, whether that be the 
second coming of Christ, the arrival of the heavenly city of the Enlightenment 
philosophers, or the withering away of the state.  Each of these revolutions, in its first 
radical phase, sought the death of an old legal order to bring forth a new order that 
would survive the Last Judgment.  Eventually, each of these revolutions settled down 
and introduced fundamental legal changes that were ultimately subsumed in and 
accommodated to the Western legal tradition.41 
In this new millennium, Berman believed, the Western legal tradition is 
undergoing a profound integrity crisis, graver and greater than any faced in the past 
millennium.  The old legal order of the West is under attack both from within and from 
without.  From within, Western law is suffering from the critical and cynical attacks 
relentlessly issued by jurists and judges – a “form of lawyerly self-loathing,” he once 
called it.  These legal skeptics have dismissed legal doctrine as malleable, self-
contradictory rhetoric.  They have depicted the law as an instrument of oppression and 
exploitation of women, of minorities, of the poor, of the different. They have derided the 
legal system for its promotion of the political purposes of the powerful and the 
propertied.  This assault from within the law, from within the legal academies and within 
the courts—devoid as it is of a positive agenda of reconstruction—reflects a cynical 
contempt for law and government, a deep loss of confidence in its integrity and efficacy.  
The “secular priests of the law,” its officials and its educators, no longer seem to believe 
in what they are doing.42 
From without, the radical transformation of economic life and the rapid 
acceptance of new social forms and customs, many born of Eastern, Southern, and 
new-age thinking, have stretched traditional Western legal doctrines to the breaking 
point.  Each of the major branches of Western law—contract, property, tort, family, 
criminal, commercial, and constitutional law—have transformed several times over in 
the past two generations.  Many of these changes may well be necessary to modernize 
the law, to conform it to contemporary social needs and ideals, to purge it of its obsolete 
ideas and institutions.  But as a consequence, Western law—always something of a 
patchwork quilt—has become more of a collection of disjointed pieces, with no single 
 
41 See a good summary in the “Introduction,” to Berman, Law and Revolution II, 1–28. 
42 This is Hugo Grotius’ phrase, which Berman has often used in personal conversations. See Hugo 
Grotius, “[The Poem] Het Beroep van Advocaat [The Calling of the Advocate] (February 18, 1602),” 
reprinted in Hugo Grotius, Anthologia Grotiana (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1955), 33. See Berman, 
Faith and Order, 351; id., “The Prophetic, Pastoral, and Priestly Vocation of the Lawyer,” The NICM 
Journal 2 (1977): 5–9. 
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thread, no single spirit holding it in place and giving it integrity and direction.  This also 
has led to profound disillusionment with and distrust of the law.43 
For Berman, these are signs of end times.  We are reaching the end of an age 
and the end of the Western legal tradition, as we have known it.  Western law is dying, 
he wrote, a new common law of all humanity is struggling to be born out of the counter-
forces of violent balkanization, radical fundamentalism, and belligerent nationalism that 
now beset us all. Western law, rooted in the soils and souls of Christianity, Judaism, 
and their secular successors, will have a place in this new common law of humanity.  
But so will the laws of the East and the South, of the tribe and the jungle, of the country 
and the city, each with its own belief system.  What needs to be forged in this new 
millennium, Berman challenged his readers, is a comprehensive new religious belief 
system, a new pattern of language and ritual, a new eschaton, that will give this 
common law of humanity its cohesion and direction.  We need a new common law and 
a new common faith on a world scale, a new ius gentium and fides populorum for the 
whole world.  We need global structures and symbols, global processes and principles.  
These cannot be found only in world-wide science and commerce, or in global literature 
and language.  They must also be sought in a new “world law” and a new “world 
religion.”  For law and religion are the only two universal solvents of human living that 
can ultimately bring true peace, order, and justice to the world.   
 
A streak of mystical millenarianism colors Berman’s historical method—much of it 
already conceived while he was a young man witnessing the carnage of World War II 
and still brimming with the heady instruction of his Dartmouth mentor, Eugen 
Rosenstock-Huessy.44  Description and prescription run rather closely together in his 
account, occasionally stumbling over each other.  Historical periods and patterns are 
rather readily equated with providential plans and purposes.  But here we have one of 
the deepest sources of many of Berman’s insights and ambitions as a legal scholar.  He 
was, as he put in an April 17, 1966, letter to Rosenstock, on a scholarly “pilgrimage.”  
It is a very long, slow, hard journey.  It goes through law and 
language, history, comparison of legal systems and cultures, 
the Great Revolutions, the communification of the nations, 
 
43 See Harold J. Berman, “The Crisis of the Western Legal Tradition,” Creighton Law Review 9 (1975): 
252–65; id., “The Moral Crisis of the Western Legal Tradition and the Weightier Matters of the Law,” 
Criterion 19(2) (1980): 15–23; id., “The Crisis of Legal Education in America,” Boston College Law 
Review 26 (1985): 347–52.  
44 See, e.g., Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy, Speech and Reality (Norwich, VT: Argo Books, 1970); id., The 
Christian Future, or The Modern Mind Outrun (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1946); id., Out of 
Revolution: Autobiography of Western Man, introduction by Harold J. Berman, (Providence, RI: Berg, 
1993).  For Berman’s assessment of his mentor, see, e.g., Harold J. Berman, “Renewal and Continuity: 
The Great Revolutions and the Western Tradition,” in Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy: Studies in His Life and 
Thought, eds., M. Darrol Bryant and Hans R. Huessy (Lewiston, NY: Edward Mellen Press, 1986): 19–29; 
id., “Recollections of Eugen [Rosenstock-Huessy], 1936-1940,” March 29, 1999, unpublished (on file in 
Emory Law School Library archives). 
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trade between planned and market economies, the hard 
struggle for peace, the reconciliation of man to his destiny and 
to God….  I have hope that I can make meaningful and 
important what you have taught me—and can possibly rescue 
a good deal of scholarship and make a contribution to 
peace—by showing, first, that American law is a human, 
creative response to the continued danger of disintegration 
and alienation, and that law altogether is a great hope for 
uniting mankind.  But law, to fulfill this hope, must be felt to be 
Speech, and a response to God’s Word.45 
   
The Emergence of Law and Language  
All of these cardinal themes of Berman’s life work can already be seen in this 
little book on Law and Language, written right in the middle of his legal career.  The 
book distills some of the keen insights he had developed in his earlier international and 
comparative law work.  It anticipates crisply some of the key themes that he went on to 
explore at great length in his Law and Revolution series and other writings in legal 
history, law and religion, and legal philosophy.  And the book has a typical Berman-like 
interdisciplinary edge, with the methods and insights of jurisprudence, history, 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, theology, philosophy, and more all adeptly and 
seamlessly integrated into his analysis.   
What makes the book all the more interesting is that Berman wrote this 
manuscript in the early 1960s when interdisciplinary approaches to legal study—
including the study of law and language46—were only in their infancy.  The regnant legal 
philosophy at the time was still the legal positivism that had dominated American, and 
broader Western, legal education for the first half of the twentieth century.  Law, 
according to legal positivists, was simply the sovereign's rules.  Legal study was simply 
the analysis of the rules that were posited, and their application in particular cases.  
Why these rules were posited, whether their positing was for good or ill, how these rules 
affected society, politics, or morality were not relevant questions for legal study.  It was 
rather common to read in legal textbooks of the day that law is an autonomous science, 
that its doctrines, language, and methods are self-sufficient, that its study is self-
contained.  It was rather common to think that law has the engines of change within 
 
45 Harold J. Berman, Letter to Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy (April 17, 1966) (on file in the Emory Law 
School Library archives). 
46 The first prominent discussion of law and literature in American legal scholarship came with Judge 
Cardozo’s essay, “Law and Literature,” in his 1931 collection, Law and Literature, and Other Essays and 
Addresses (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co, 1931), 3–40.  See collection of later materials in William R. 
Bishin and Christopher D. Stone, Law, Language, and Ethics: An Introduction to Law and Legal Method 
(Mineola, NY: Foundation Press, 1972) and James Boyd White, The Legal Imagination (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1973 [rev. ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985])), discussed further below. 
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itself; that, through its own design and dynamic, law marches teleologically through time 
“from trespass to case to negligence, from contract to quasi-contract to implied 
warranty.”47  
To be sure, American legal positivism was not without its detractors.  Already in 
the 1920s and 1930s, sociologists of law argued that the nature and purpose of law and 
politics cannot be understood without reference to the spirit of a people and their 
times—of a Volksgeist und Zeitgeist as their German counterparts put it.48  The legal 
realist movement of the 1930s and 1940s used the new insights of psychology and 
anthropology to cast doubt on the immutability and ineluctability of judicial reasoning.49  
The revived natural law movement of the 1940s and 1950s saw in the horrors of Hitler’s 
Holocaust and Stalin’s gulags the perils of constructing a legal system without 
transcendent checks and balances.50  The international human rights movement of the 
1950s and 1960s pressed the law to address more directly the sources and sanctions of 
civil, political, social, cultural, and economic rights.51   
By the 1960s, the confluence of these and other movements had exposed the 
limitations of a positivist definition of law standing alone.  Berman was in the vanguard 
of leading jurists—which included his colleagues Roscoe Pound and Lon Fuller as well 
as Jerome Hall, Karl Llewellyn, and others—who were pressing for a broader 
interdisciplinary philosophy of law.  Of course, they said in concurrence with legal 
positivists, law consists of rules—the black letter rules of contracts, torts, property, 
corporations, and sundry other familiar subjects.  Of course, law draws to itself a distinct 
legal science, an "artificial reason," as Sir Edward Coke once put it.52  But law is much 
more than the rules of the state and how we apply and analyze them.  Law is also the 
social activity by which certain norms are formulated by legitimate authorities and 
actualized by persons subject to those authorities.  The process of legal formulation 
involves legislating, adjudicating, administering, and other conduct by legitimate 
officials.  The process of legal actualization involves obeying, negotiating, litigating, and 
other conduct by legal subjects.  Law is rules, plus the social and political processes of 
 
47 Barbara Shapiro, “Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England,” Stanford Law Review 21 (1969): 
728. 
48 See, e.g., Julius Stone, The Province and Function of Law: Law as Logic, Justice, and Social Control 
(London: Stevens, 1947); Gustav Radbruch, Der Geist des englischen Recht (Heidelberg: A. Rausch, 
1946). 
49 William W. Fisher, Morton Horowitz, and Thomas Reed, eds., American Legal Realism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1993); Wilfred E. Rumble, American Legal Realism: Skepticism, Reform, and the 
Judicial Process (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1968). 
50 Charles Grove Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (New York: Russell & Russell, 1965); 
Roscoe Pound, The Revival of Natural Law (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1942). 
51 John Witte, Jr. and Johan D. Van der Vyver, eds., Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 2 
vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
52 Anthony Lewis, “Sir Edward Coke (1552–1633): His Theory of ‘Artificial Reason’ as a Context for 
Modern Basic Legal Theory,” Law Quarterly Review 84 (1968): 330. 
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formulating, enforcing, and responding to those rules.53 Numerous other institutions, 
besides the state, are involved in this legal functionality.  The rules, customs, and 
processes of churches, colleges, corporations, clubs, charities, and other non-state 
associations are just as much a part of a society's legal system as those of the state.  
Numerous other norms, besides legal rules, are involved in the legal process.  Rule and 
obedience, authority and liberty are exercised out of a complex blend of concerns, 
conditions, and character traits—class, gender, persuasion, piety, charisma, clemency, 
courage, moderation, temperance, force, faith, and more.54  
Legal positivism could not, by itself, come to terms with law understood in this 
broader sense.  In the 1960s, American jurists thus began to turn with increasing 
alacrity to the methods and insights of other disciplines to enhance their legal 
formulations.  This was the birthing process of the modern movement of interdisciplinary 
legal study.  The movement was born to enhance the province and purview of legal 
study, to refigure the roots and routes of legal analysis, to render more holistic and 
realistic our appreciation of law in community, in context, in concert with politics, social 
sciences, and other disciplines.55   
Berman’s pithy little volume on Law and Language, like his equally pithy little 
volume on The Interaction of Law and Religion published ten years later, is a valuable 
artifact from these early days of interdisciplinary legal study in America.  N.E.H. Hull 
calls this kind of early work “bricolage jurisprudence,” given its “marvelously far-ranging 
and free-thinking eclecticism.”56  Hull got this term from French anthropologist, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss, who used it to refer to the work of creative French handymen—
bricoleurs—who worked with “whatever [was] at hand,” tools that were not designed for 
the present task.57  Berman and other early interdisciplinary legal scholars, like Pound 
and Llewellyn, similarly “collect[ed] ideas from their vast reading of their predecessors in 
jurisprudence, as well as of economists, social psychologists, sociologists, and 
historians.”58  Eclecticism was the spirit of the times, and Berman was exuberantly 
broad in his use of sources from all manner of disciplines to aid his study of law.   
 
53 Berman, Law and Revolution, 44ff.; Jerome Hall, Comparative Law and Social Theory (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 78ff. See also Berman, Law and Language, chapter 2. 
54 See further John Witte, Jr., “Introduction,” to John Witte, Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, eds., The 
Teachings of Modern Christianity on Law, Politics, and Human Nature, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), xx–xxxvii. 
55 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, “The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship,” Yale Law Journal 90 
(1981): 1113–30; Robert C. Clark, “The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution,” Yale Law Journal 90 
(1981): 1238–74; Symposium, “American Legal Scholarship: Directions and Dilemmas,” Journal of Legal 
Education 33 (1983): 403–11.  
56 N.E.H. Hull, Roscoe Pound & Karl Llewellyn: Search for an American Jurisprudence (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 8–10. 
57 Ibid., 9. 
58 Ibid., 10–11. 
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Not only was intellectual eclecticism the new fashion of legal education in the 
early 1960s, but political danger was the perennial worry.  The world was gripped by 
deep fear born of the Cold War and the Cuban Missile Crisis, while still reeling from the 
devastation of World Wars I and II.  For Berman, the academy was no ivory tower 
refuge.  “Two world wars, and the threat of a third,” he wrote, with the Cuban Missile 
Crisis just averted, “have joined all mankind in a common destiny.  We are all in contact 
with each other.  Paradoxically, the human race is becoming unified by its capacity for 
self-destruction.”59   
The Cold War between the United States and the USSR, in particular, shaped 
Berman’s efforts in Law and Language to work out a theory of “communification”: to 
form sympathetic bonds of community through better mutual understanding of each 
other’s cultures, languages, and laws, and more conversation to overcome the “tragic 
disunity which now threatens to destroy us.”60 In the 1950s and 1960s, he wrote a 
series of popular articles in the American press, designed to bring greater 
understanding of Russian families, farms, and workers, of Russian religion, morality, 
and values, of Russian science, education, and sports.61  He also wrote popular articles 
and longer law reviews recommending concrete legal measures to open up commerce, 
trade, and travel between the USSR and the United States—a theme to which he 
returned many times.62  He saw more international trade and travel to be essential initial 
steps of communication and intercourse that would lead to deeper and more stable 
understanding and peace.63  He also arranged to have broadcast into the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe his series of Talks on American Law, to give Russian listeners a 
better and a clearer understanding of what American law was all about. 
 
59 See Berman, Law and Language, 162.  
60 Ibid., 48. 
61 Harold J. Berman, “Divorce and Domestic Relations in Soviet Law,” Virginia Law Weekly 2(2) (April 
1950): 28–33; id., “Soviet Planning,” Atlantic Monthly (December 1951): 11–12, 14; id. “The Soviet 
Family,” Atlantic Monthly (February 1952): 18–20; id. and Miroslav Kerner, “Soviet Military Discipline,” 
Military Review 32(3) (June 1952): 19–29; id. and Miroslav Kerner, “Soviet Military Discipline,” Military 
Review 32(4) (July 1952): 3–15; Harold J. Berman, “The Soviet Worker,” Atlantic Monthly (July 1952): 8–
10; id., “The Soviet Soldier,” Atlantic Monthly (September 1952): 4, 6, 8; id., “The Soviet Peasant,” 
Atlantic Monthly (March 1953): 15–18; id., “Soviet Education,” Atlantic Monthly (April 1953): 16–19; id., 
“Soviet Trade,” Atlantic Monthly (August 1954): 14–17; id., “Real Property Actions in Soviet Law,” Tulane 
Law Review 29 (June 1955): 687–96; id., “Impressions of Moscow,” Harvard Law School Bulletin 7(3) 
(December 1955): 7–8; id., “The Current Movement for Law Reform in the Soviet Union,” American Slavic 
and East European Review 15 (April 1956): 179–89; id., “Soviet Legal Reforms,” The Nation 182 (June 
30, 1956): 546–48. “Soviet Law and Government,” Modern Law Review 21 (January 1958): 19–26; id., 
“Limited Rule of Law,” Christian Science Monitor (April 29, 1958): 9; id., “The Devil and Soviet Russia,” 
The American Scholar 27 (Spring 1958): 147–52. 
62 Harold J. Berman, “The Problems that Unite Us,” The Nation 192 (February 18, 1961): 132; see also, 
interview by Michael J. Ryan, “Berman: Losing Enemies by Making Friends,” Harvard Law Record 
(February 25, 1965): 5–6. 
63 Harold J. Berman, “Thinking Ahead:  East-West Trade,” Harvard Business Review 32(5) (1954): 147–
58; id., “The Legal Framework of Trade Between Planned and Market Economies”; id., “Negotiating 
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These were first steps in Berman’s gradual development of the field of 
comparative legal studies—especially comparisons of the Soviet and American legal 
systems, analyses of particular Soviet legal institutions, and linguistic analysis and 
translation of Soviet codes, statutes, and other legal materials.64  Mastering the legal 
language and legal concepts of another people would prove to be a lasting feature of 
Berman’s scholarly work not only on Russia in these early days, but also eventually on 
other big foreign legal systems like China and Japan.65  He pressed his students 
relentlessly to learn foreign languages and to translate their work to and from foreign 
languages.  He also urged his readers to learn to parse closely the letter and spirit, the 
anatomy and physiology of foreign legal materials.  He demonstrated that hermeneutic 
brilliantly in his many translations of Russian private, public, and military laws, and in his 
careful linguistic analysis of the recent Soviet Criminal Code, where he showed the 
many layers of ancient Christian morality and socialist innovation in the palimpsest of 
Soviet criminal law.66   
For Berman, a comparative legal scholar had to understand not only the law on 
the books, but also the law in action.  And that required him to be on site in the nations 
he studied—to interview judges and lawyers, to observe the legislature and courts in 
session, to have open talks with fellow scholars, ambassadors, and state officials about 
their legal systems and the American legal system. Russia was again his most critical 
laboratory in the years that he wrote Law and Language.  In the late 1950s and 1960s 
he pressed relentlessly to get visas to travel to Russia.  When state bureaucrats on both 
sides blocked him, he began writing directly to Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev.  On 
February 13, 1955, he sent this cable: 
NIKITA KHRUSHCHVEV THE KREMLIN MOSCOW USSR  
NEW YORK TIMES REPORTS TODAY YOU DESIRE MORE 
NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES 
AND SOVIET UNON PERIOD…. I APPLIED ONE YEAR 
 
64 Harold J. Berman, “The Comparison of Soviet and American Law,” Indiana Law Journal 34 (1959): 
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AGO FOR SOVIET VISA TO DISCUSS WITH EXPORT AND 
IMPORT OFFICIALS CONCRETE COMMERCIAL AND 
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TRADING IN VARIOUS 
COMMODITIES PERIOD.  I HAVE RECEIVED NO REPLY…. 
PERIOD.67 
Within a month, Berman had his visa, and took the first of his many trips to the USSR.  
A few years later, he applied for a visiting law professorship in Moscow, and again got 
caught up in miles of red tape.  He again wrote to Chairman Khrushchev revealing his 
belief in comparative legal study as a source of better mutual understanding between 
nations: 
I am taking the liberty of writing to you about a matter which 
deeply concerns me as an American jurist who is working for 
better relations between the United States of America and the 
Soviet Union—namely, the matter of exchanges of visits 
between Soviet and American jurists…. 
I am convinced that Soviet officials charged with responsibility 
for cultural exchanges with the United States have failed to 
grasp a very simple point: that the very best Soviet 
propaganda in the United States is to send us your jurists.  
The United States is governed by jurists more than by any 
other professional group.  [But] the view is very widespread in 
the United States (even among our jurists, who should know 
better), that law and legality play a very minor role in the 
Soviet Union.  Many Americans are surprised to learn that 
jurists even exist in the Soviet Union…. 
Perhaps what I have written so far might give the impression 
that I am thinking only in terms of the benefit to the Soviet 
Union which can result from visits by Soviet jurists to the 
United States.  But I am thinking primarily of the benefit to both 
of our countries, and to the cause of peace.  Frankly, I believe 
that the Soviet Union has at least as much to learn about the 
United States, and especially about our legal system, as the 
United States has to learn about Soviet law.  Even more 
important is what we can learn from each other about the 
 
67 Quoted by Robert C. Clark, “Preface to A Conference on the Work of Harold J. Berman,” Emory Law 
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necessary conditions for establishing better legal relations 
between our countries, and among all countries.68  
Berman followed this up with a direct appeal to Chairman Khrushchev at a reception in 
New York, following Khrushchev’s famous shoe-banging speech at the United Nations.  
When he met the Chairman in the receiving line, he explained urgently -- in fluent 
Russian, which impressed the Chairman --why he wanted to come to the Soviet Union 
to teach.  Khrushchev listened intently, nodded, then instructed an aide to “take care of 
him.”  Berman soon got his visa to teach in Moscow for a year.69 There he finished the 
new edition of his classic monograph, Justice in the USSR. 
The Main Themes of Law and Language  
It was in that same year of 1963, flush with interdisciplinary and international 
ambition, that Berman began work in earnest on Law and Language.70 In five chapters, 
he laid out his interdisciplinary theory of language, of legal language, and of the 
development of legal language – in general, in comparative perspective, and in 
American history.  A stirring conclusion, “Can Communication Build One World?” sets 
out his optimistic agenda for the development of a world law and world community – no 
small dream in the bitterly divided 1960s – and a call for Christians, in particular, to take 
up the great cause of fostering justice, peace, and unity within diversity.  
Berman’s basic aim in his book is to provide an understanding of law that reveals 
its ability to build community and foster peaceful relationships among individuals and 
nations.  Berman was convinced that the Western legal tradition, and the world 
community altogether, had the resources in its linguistic heritages to overcome its most 
dangerous tensions and divisions. Candid, learned, empathetic, and peaceful 
conversation across religions, cultures, and nations was the key. 
“Communification” was Berman’s new term for the process by which humans 
make and sustain communities, from the local to the global.71 Language plays a critical 
role in this process, since language is ultimately a social phenomenon. Though words 
mean particular things, language as a practice is as much about meaning-making as it 
is about the “reciprocal transfer of meaning.”72 We need a new verb, “speak-listen,” 
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Berman wrote, to capture this reciprocal dynamic in language.73 This heritage of 
language, its socializing function, defends society from dissolution and disintegration:  
[L]anguage is a social event, not only in the sense that it 
brings together the participants in a conversation or dialogue 
… but also in the sense that it brings together all the members 
of the language-community—those who have created the 
expressions we use, those who have taught them to us, our 
ancestors, our nation, our family, our teachers, our 
colleagues.74 
Language is also the historical deposit of a community’s social life, Berman 
continued.  Each community has, in a sense, its own language, and we all inhabit many 
communities with distinctive languages. The loss of these linguistic communities, or 
their inability to speak to each other, is a grave threat.  This was particularly true during 
the Cold War, whose propaganda machines and censorship campaigns on both sides 
violated the vital community-building power of language.  The Cold War divisions were 
exacerbated by the inability of both sides to understand the other’s language, culture, 
and law, which stymied meaningful negotiation.  But since all humans speak language 
and all language bears similar marks and performs similar functions in each community, 
broader communities, even between bitter enemies, can be formed through the 
common experience and judicious translation of their most essential texts, not least their 
legal texts.  Translation and conversation, Berman argued, are the beginning of making 
peace and the basis for lasting peace. The words we share, the common language we 
build, become symbols of our budding new community. Though there are no easy 
solutions to deep conflicts, especially those as vast as the Cold War, understanding the 
other in our own language, and having a common language to understand the tensions 
that exist on both sides, is an essential beginning point. 
 “Conviviality”—from “con” and “vivere,” meaning “living together”—is another 
term that captures part of Berman’s efforts in Law and Language.  While words are 
important, Berman always moves outward, towards the whole. Words are part of 
language, which is the substance of a community’s social life. This social life takes 
shape in rituals and rites that are marked by “conviviality.”75  Language and tradition are 
the stable ground of a community’s life together, giving those people with common 
cause the common means to talk together, to work together, and to live peaceably 
together. “Even faculty meetings serve a necessary function in this respect,” Berman 
writes, “and academicians are wrong to disparage them.”76 (Professors: please lower 
your eyebrows, and read on.) 
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This also serves as a reminder to traditionalists that traditions serve the purpose 
of allowing individuals to share life together—amidst conflict—rather than to obfuscate 
and exclude. Berman was quite aware of the dangers of specialization in modern, 
industrialized society: “all are threatened by a polyglot culture, in which the only words 
that everybody hears or reads are the slogans of commercial advertisements and of 
political propaganda. Our common speech is threatened with debasement.”77 The 
tension between expertise and generality, between cultures and legal traditions, is the 
same: “the health of any society depends upon its ability to maintain and develop its 
common language without destroying the identity of the separate languages into which 
the common language is continually being broken.”78 Law is especially susceptible to 
this problem, since legal language is almost continually maligned as an alien tongue. 
When it functions properly, however, legal language creates venues for speaking 
of and hearing about conflict and how to resolve it.  Legal language also creates 
channels of negotiating, cooperating, and planning our lives together.  In this way, law 
serves an important communifying function, since it works to prevent disintegration and 
injustice in a community, “creating order and giving orders,” convincing and exhorting. 
Instead of just “referring” to things, Berman wrote, legal terms create relationships and 
rights among persons.  For these purposes, legal language needs formality and 
ceremony—words which show the legal relationships overlaying the parties, and a 
setting like a court room to show that justice is being done with impartiality and 
authority: 
Especially in primitive societies, and in primitive situations in 
modern societies, that is, when passions run high, the law-
speaking authority needs words which characterize the 
grievance (or the economic or social problem demanding 
solution) to the satisfaction of both sides and which at the 
same time command the respect of the community as a 
whole.79 
Given the essential relationship between language, experience, community, and 
law, Berman argued further for an historical approach to law.  Such an approach gives 
proper place to tradition in the process of creating law and maintaining legal meaning: 
[T]he ability of a society to maintain traditions is absolutely 
essential to progress, for it alone makes it possible to introduce 
changes that will themselves, in turn, have stability. The 
capacity to change is a negation of progress when it is not 
linked with the capacity to preserve. For, without the capacity 
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to preserve, there is no change in the sense of taking a new 
direction but only a perpetual series of changes, each 
cancelling the other.80 
This historical view of language is important for the American legal tradition, Berman 
wrote, a vital part of the distinctive American understanding of the “rule of law.”  
“America inherited the idea of the historicity of law from England, and ultimately from the 
Western concept of historical development. But America embodied that idea both in its 
vital doctrine of precedent, as well as in a written document, thereby fixing permanently 
the language of American Constitutional law.”81 The Constitution itself is an example of 
the developmental power of tradition and stabilizing force of tradition. 
Law and Language, Law and Revolution   
These themes and concepts are also at the basis of Berman’s magnum opus, 
Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition, published in 1983, 
but in early stages of writing already when he was writing Law and Language. Though 
masterful as a path-breaking history of medieval law, Law and Revolution was deeply 
informed by the historical-linguistic jurisprudence developed in Law and Language. 
Berman found, in the centralization of political and legal authority in the medieval 
Catholic Church, an expansive historical laboratory for exploring law, language, and 
community. 
While the book may be remembered for its broad revision of Western legal 
history, Berman devotes the many pages of his introduction to developing a more 
concrete picture of the communicative-historical view of law he formed in Law and 
Language. There is a sense in which Law and Language sets the theoretical stage for 
Berman’s history of legal unification. 
Berman begins Law and Revolution with a discussion of the role of tradition and 
history in legal change.  The object of Berman’s study, “the West,” is both a “historical 
structure” and a “structured history.”82  He is quick to point out, as he did in Law and 
Language, that legal change inevitably involves the legal and cultural past of the society 
experiencing the change. The historical structure of revolution always involves an 
engagement with the past.  “The concept of law as a particular kind of enterprise … 
becomes meaningful in the context of the actual historical development of the living law 
of a given culture.” 83 
Even before the legal cultures of the pre-West were melded into the first modern 
legal system through the Papal Revolution, Berman writes, the folk law of pre-modern 
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Europe revealed the role of communication and language in law.  Law was a matter of 
poetics and persuasion, deeply intertwined with the religious beliefs of early societies. 
What began as a legal system characterized by fatalism and war84 became transformed 
by the influence of Christianity in Germanic folk communities.85  The transference and 
tension between separate communal languages is on full display in the conflict between 
their fatalistic, pagan law of the early Germanic tribes and the distinct concepts and 
stories of early Christianity.  This theological influence became predominant in the 
period after the Papal Revolution.86 
The ability of a common language to shape law, and more importantly, the ability 
of a common law to shape community, is shown in Berman’s extensive treatment of the 
cultural sources, institutional supports, and rhetorical methods of medieval canon law, 
the one universal law of Western Christendom. The unification, indeed creation, of the 
West, Berman writes, began in the crucible of the Papal Revolution, the revolutionary 
change introduced by Pope Gregory VII and his successors in the later eleventh and 
twelfth centuries. Berman’s abstract picture of communification is filled out in this 
moving historical picture. Community and law are shaped in particular through social 
institutions, rhetorical-analytical strategies, and political maneuvering.87 According to 
Berman, the dialectical analytical methods of distinction and synthesis allowed legal 
scholars at the West’s first universities to reconcile the differences among the diverse 
legal and political systems represented early Europe.88 From an institutional 
perspective, legal scholars were permitted to exercise a great deal of freedom in 
questioning and debate, which contributed to the creative jurisdictional, procedural, and 
substantive legal advances of newly unifying Europe.89 Greek philosophy, Roman law, 
and Christian theology formed the common language of the new universities. Berman 
recognized that, despite the humanizing possibilities of dialogue, the unification of 
medieval Christendom also came by political stratagem and the sword.90 But, he says, 
the common conceptual languages of philosophy and theology, the common spoken 
language of Latin, and the common system of canon law all helped to consolidate and 
expand the medieval papal regime. 
 
Berman’s Sources and Foils in Law and Language 
Berman’s argument in Law and Language was grounded in the best 
philosophical and social science literature of the day. While the text is rife with 
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references, Bronislaw Malinowski, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf, and Kenneth 
Burke deserve special mention. Each of these theorists prized cultural particularity, the 
bounded-ness of language to thought, the subjectivity of the individual, and the 
dramatic, dialogical character of human existence.  Each of them also challenged the 
naïve objectivism and false universalism of some earlier social scientists—criticisms 
that Berman took to heart in Law and Language.   
Prior to Bronislaw Malinowski’s work, it was commonly thought that “savage” 
societies were developmentally inferior, having few social or cultural conventions. 
According to anthropologists, Jane Hill and Bruce Mannheim, the intellectual life of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by “a naïve … universalism in 
grammar, and an equally vulgar evolutionism in anthropology and history.”91 
Malinowski’s field work with the Trobriand islanders showed that “primitive” culture was 
as complex and refined in its cultural objects and systems of meaning as that of modern 
European nations. Through his fine-grained studies of Trobriand life, Malinowski 
became the “father” of ethnography in anthropology.92  His fieldwork manifested the 
anthropological necessity of first-hand, fact-based, empirical analysis obtained through 
living together with the communities being studied. At the same time, Malinowski 
challenged anthropologists and ethnographers to understand the challenges of the 
ethnographer, who is both “chronicler and historian.”  There is an interpretive distance 
between the ethnographer, his anthropological facts, and his final presentation, 
Malinowski insisted, which required critical exercises of subjective judgment and 
interpretive discretion.93 
The problem of subjectivity in scientific work was addressed in detail by 
anthropologist Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Lee Whorf.  On several 
occasions in Law and Language, Berman acknowledged his debt to both men. While 
allowing that there is some objective and universal “fact” at the heart of understanding, 
Whorf and Sapir argued that these facts are construed through the idiomatic and 
habitual patterns of language which shape the thought and method of anthropology.  
Even this binary fact-language picture is problematic, since language is more than just a 
cultural “label” for objective facts, but is constitutive of the entire process and object of 
research. The “real world,” the world of “facts,” is as mediated by cultural and linguistic 
habits and particularities as the most idiomatic English expression.94  Sapir and Whorf’s 
emphasis on the fundamental, constitutive importance of language was a critical 
reference point for Berman’s argument in Law and Language.  It shaped his response to 
Jeremy Bentham’s attempt to reduce language to its “neutral, objective” meaning, and it 
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leads him to endorse Friedrich Carl von Savigny’s emphasis on history and cultural 
particularity in law reform.95 
The final important social science touchstone for Berman was rhetorician and 
philosopher Kenneth Burke.  His major work, A Rhetoric of Motives, translated this view 
of language into a holistic account of human interaction with other humans and with the 
world. For Burke, the material world is already cast through the “filter” of language when 
humans come to understand it. These syntheses of material reality and linguistic symbol 
are called motives. Rhetorical devices, scientific viewpoints, and moral systems are all 
interpretive lenses for material reality, which can lead to different ideas of what is 
important about material reality or even what material reality is. The sharing and 
identification of these motives among groups of people leads to “consubstantiality,” that 
is, a shared identity though shared interpretations of a common symbol. Burke used the 
United States Constitution as an example, which may have inspired Berman’s 
appropriation of Burke in the legal context.  Since we are speaking beings, our common 
nature is produced through the dramatic and rhetorical sharing of common symbols and 
motives; law is especially relevant as an example of shared identity through 
communication.96 
These debates in linguistics and anthropology were accompanied by analogous 
disputes and developments in mid-twentieth century philosophy. These Berman also 
followed, albeit at a greater distance; technical philosophy was never his thing.  By the 
early 1950s, Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations had decisively put to 
rest the efforts of Anglo-American philosophers to render a pure and perfectly rational 
language.  Wittgenstein’s Investigations explored the roots of linguistic meaning in 
social forms of life. Words are not primarily or only arrows that point to things; words are 
used in different ways as parts of social practices.97  Similarly, Hans-Georg Gadamer, a 
student of Martin Heidegger, had just finished his magisterial Truth and Method, where 
he declared that hermeneutics was ontology—that is, language and interpretation 
preceded and undergirded our most basic philosophical understanding of the being of 
anything at all.  Things, in a certain sense, have “existence” through language.98  Almost 
every discipline in the university experienced a “turn to language” in the middle of the 
twentieth century.  This was the intellectual climate of Berman’s foray into the most 
linguistic of disciplines—that of law. 
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Two other critical figures for Berman in Law and Language are the later 
eighteenth-century English political philosopher, Edmund Burke, and the nineteenth-
century German jurist, Friedrich Carl von Savigny.  Both of these scholarly giants 
anticipated many of the developments in linguistics and anthropology that Berman 
found attractive.99  Savigny and Burke were alike in viewing law as the unique 
achievement of a culture.  As the law responds to its particular problems, they argued, it 
develops common solutions that have wide consensus and moral weight.  These 
insights led both men to oppose needless or hasty law reform or legal codification by 
whoever happened to be in power.  Law, they said, is a fragile, interdependent historical 
heritage of the entire people, rather than a series of neutral and transient commands of 
a sovereign.  Each nation has its own character and its own legal needs, and their law 
has moral force because it builds on the customs of a people responding to their 
common needs.  Berman took to heart this historical, communitarian view of law, and 
adapted it to address the international tensions that so shaped the 1960s. If law is a 
product of communities, citizens of all communities need to form an international 
community, and each of their legal systems needs to be discussed, understood, and 
sifted for their convergences, common elements, and creative tensions. 
Law and Language is not without its sympathetic villains.  The English utilitarian 
philosopher and law reformer, Jeremy Bentham, stands in for an entire perspective on 
law, scholarship, and language that Berman rejected. This is not only the legal 
positivism for which Bentham was famous, but also the reference theory of word-
meaning, a legal reformism insensitive to the historical framework and cultural context 
of law.  Berman did not begrudge Bentham his accomplishments as a reformer and 
theorist of legal language.  Nor did he begrudge the keen insights of Bentham’s modern 
disciple, the preeminent Oxford jurist, H.L.A. Hart.  While admiring Bentham for his 
energetic attack on self-deception in the law, Berman also criticized Bentham for his 
single-minded attempt to neuter legal language.100  As Berman explained in Law and 
Language, Bentham attempted to root out the emotional and rhetorical characteristics of 
legal language.  If legal language is neutered, however, Berman argued, the critical 
“communifying” function of law is impaired.  By the same token, if legal scholars choose 
to separate the moral (and emotional and rhetorical) characteristics of law from its 
positive “legal” content, they lose their perception of the critical role law plays in shaping 
a group’s moral life and uniting individuals into enduring bonds of community. Here we 
see, in the ripples of Kenneth Burke’s A Rhetoric of Motives, a tacit interdisciplinary 
response to the new legal positivism. 
Bentham’s linguistic reformism was taken up by practicing lawyer and UCLA law 
professor David Mellinkoff, in his classic text The Language of Law, published just as 
Berman was finishing the first draft of Law and Language.  Legal scholars at the time 
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viewed this book as a novel and important achievement. “Here is a book unlike any 
other,” said reviewer Saul Cohen in 1964.101  Early reviewers seemed to agree that 
Mellinkoff’s book was an important cri de coeur against the problems of antiquated 
linguistic habits that prized ambiguity and esotericism, and they praised his efforts to 
bring about a critical program of legal and linguistic reform.102  The book was popular 
enough to end up in the hands of distinguished poet and “ex-lawyer” Archibald 
Macleish, who carved out a space in public letters for him: “Mr. Mellinkoff is wittier than 
Mencken as well as being considerably more civilized.”103 Berman’s copy of the 
Mellinkoff text is well-marked, and his comments on the history and poetics of legal 
language are at least a partial, albeit tacit, response to Mellinkoff’s path-breaking text. 
In a late-life reflection, Mellinkoff recalled the early days of his corporate law 
practice.  As a young associate, he wrote, “I did as I was told. I followed the office 
pattern: Sentences long enough to choke a horse. I looked at the opinions: Words 
repeated endlessly in different forms: by and with, each and every, null and void, made 
and provided, keep and maintain. On and on. English grammar became a matter of 
twists and turns.”104 His magnum opus, The Language of the Law, recounts the history 
of Anglo-American linguistic habits, from the argot of Law French, twinned in the 
synthesis of English and French legal traditions, to the constant criticism of legal-ese 
from the colonial period to today.105 What has resulted is a legal language and a legal 
profession that is “wordy,” “unclear,” “pompous,” and “dull.”106 Though Berman was 
most interested in Mellinkoff’s presentation of the history, Mellinkoff himself hoped to 
provoke the development of a durable, intelligible, precise, and concise language for 
practitioners which would redound to the benefit of clients, judges, and juries who live 
by and interpret this work-product.107 Deferring to Mellinkoff, Berman himself recognized 
these problems in legal language: “if the roots of law in the whole body of living 
language of the community are neglected, the power of law to hold it together is 
weakened.”108  
Altogether, Berman is to be admired for his open-minded and fair appropriation of 
the leading social scientists and historical jurists in his interdisciplinary approach to the 
study of law and language. While many of the scholars he used may now only be 
remembered in dusty books and on fading tombstones, their work did set the stage for 
our post-modern academy. The problems of language-relativity, subjectivity, and 
objectivity in observation and method continue to haunt social science, post-colonial 
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scholarship, and every shade of critical and cultural studies. The role of history and 
tradition in shaping morality and legality are now hot topics of American constitutional 
theory, and in modern American cases dealing with fundamental rights and the 
appropriate constitutional relationships between citizens, states, and the federal 
government.  And these matters are taken up in earnest by the law and language 
movements in the legal academy today.  
The Modern Law and Language Movement 
The modern study of law and language can be divided, roughly, into two groups: 
a “rhetorical-humanistic” group and a “linguistic” group. While there are many 
treatments of language and law that fall outside or in between these groups, these are 
the mainstays in modern scholarship.  Berman’s Law and Language book anticipated a 
number of important themes at work in both these schools.109 
The rhetorical-humanistic school of the “law and language” movement had an 
important early start in the 1984 conference on hermeneutics and law at the University 
of Southern California.  The hefty symposium issue of the Southern California Law 
Review that resulted was marked by an exuberant diversity of methods and styles 
without a common approach, methodology, or theme.110 A more systematic approach 
came the next year with the publication of University of Michigan law professor, James 
Boyd White’s The Legal Imagination.  This was an elegant and judiciously assembled 
collection of literary excerpts, legal texts, and exercises in the style of a casebook, 
designed to help students understand the rhetorical aspects of legal practice and the 
moral and humane motives that should inform a humanistic practice of the law.111 
James Boyd White’s work in this and subsequent books has two principal themes 
that are congenial with the insights that Berman had proffered a generation earlier.  
First, White’s theory of law and language emphasizes the role of language and dialogue 
in making community. Second, White brilliantly analyzes the rhetorical and moral 
content of American law and American community—the relationships between speaker 
and listener and the moral and communal values implicit in judicial and legal language.  
Unlike Berman, whose focus was legal history and comparative law, White focuses on 
American law today. In his Living Speech, for example, White observes that the 
inhumanity and dehumanization of persons in war, in advertising, and in electioneering 
are based on speech and its capacity to frame the world. Learning how to speak in a 
humanizing way is the first step to understanding the empire of force and learning how 
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not to respect it. Sentimentalities, trivialities, slogans, falsities, and denials, White 
argues, are all forms of dead speech that dehumanize persons and corrode the 
community.112 
Also like Berman, White claims that the law translates ordinary life into legal 
argument, and vice versa. The incidental character of Supreme Court opinions calls the 
public and the Court into a continual practice of making meaning, making sense, and 
making justice in life. The language of justice is critical for White, as it was for Berman: 
So is naming injustice, rather than reducing our discourse to “gratification,” “power,” or 
“instrumentalism.” Practicing meaningful language, free from sentiment and cliché, is a 
necessary foundation for the difficult process of just judicial decision-making which is a 
sine qua non of the rule of law.113 
Advertising and sloganeering, White continues, reduces our world into 
commodities more than communities, and reduces individuals into consumers more 
than citizens or communal actors.  A common theme of White’s work is that living 
speech respects each individual as a source and site of narrative and meaning. 
Meaning-making is the essence of speech, and speech is the cornerstone of 
community. Courts must take account of the value of speech, with this in mind—not only 
in interpreting the First Amendment Free Speech Clause, but in crafting the language of 
their opinions in all cases. Speech as mere information for consumption is not valuable 
in the same way. “[The Court] would see the world as a world of people talking, not 
making deals or transactions.”114 
Like Berman, White further notes that the danger of legal translation is 
abstraction, loss of context and cultural nuance. In his Justice as Translation, White 
argues that language makes a culture, with its own assumptions, values, and pictures of 
the world. “Conceptual” language is anti-linguistic, because it assumes that language is 
just pointing, rather than constitutive of thought and knowledge. This view of the world is 
imperialistic, says White, because one language is assumed to express a concept 
completely or sufficiently; the differences between languages and cultures are elided as 
mere differences in clarity. This view of language is also antagonistic, ruling out 
contradictions and conflicts in experience and other languages. This view reduces 
writing and speech to rationalistic outline.115 
White’s alternative view is this: language does not express concepts, but makes 
meaning; indeed, language is the very act of meaning and of being. Words get their 
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meaning through their cultural, textual, and practical contexts.  How they are used—in 
sentences, in books, in poems, in literature, or in judicial opinions alike—gives these 
words meaning, form, practicality, and identity-marking functions. This means that 
language is individualized by context and by the speaker, who gains meaning, identity, 
understanding, and direction through the experience of language. The meaning we 
express isn't in an idea, concept, or sense datum, but in language as it is expressed in 
its entire context.  
White would agree with Berman that good translation—across space, time, 
culture, discipline, and social place—is a preeminent example of the “communifying” 
characteristics of language. The effort of translating words, speeches, and texts reflects 
an ethic of respect for the other person, the other language, the other culture.  If done 
well, translation reflects an ethic of fidelity to the other, rather than dominance or 
replacement of a critical marker of identity and meaning. The practice of law, White 
argues, reflects this view of translation, too. Lawyers must speak lay language as well 
as legal language, respecting and taking up the client's story into the language of law, 
and using legal language to draw out meanings from the client’s story that may not be 
as significant in the client’s language.  That, for White, is a fundamental ingredient of 
legal professionalism.116 
All of life, in fact, White continues, involves this kind of translation, because each 
person is a unique source of meaning; the object is, in life as in law, to be individuals 
who respect the other without losing their sense of self. Out of this reciprocal 
engagement with others, we create ourselves and together we create community. The 
question for lawyers and the law is: will the law be a place for this reciprocal exchange 
and engagement, a place for “multivocality,” or will it be the blunt object of “bureaucratic 
and theoretical power”? Human community and language lives through this process of 
reciprocal interaction, response, and translation.117 
The problem of translation into legal argument, especially within the courtroom, is 
taken up in earnest by Milner S. Ball in The Promise of American Law. Ball, a 
longstanding friend and admirer of Berman, moves from the translation of legal 
languages to the translation of law into dramatic enactment. Ball conceives the entire 
legal process along the lines of theater, where justice must be done, but just as 
importantly, justice must be seen to be done. The trial itself, for Ball, is an event of 
community ratification and belonging. Just as Malinowski would describe the rites of 
initiation, marriage, or reconciliation in primitive societies as absolutely necessary to 
community solidarity and social order, Ball describes the modern American courtroom 
as a place that reaffirms the commitment of every participant to the covenant of law in 
American society—whether litigants or advocates, judges or court officials, witnesses or 
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audience members.118  Ball provides a helpful analogue and extension to Berman’s 
insights in Law and Language; he fills out the challenges and possibilities of translation, 
drama, and community.  
Berman’s basic picture of law is consonant with the “metaphor” of law as a 
“medium of social relationships” recommended in Milner Ball’s signature title, Lying 
Down Together. According to Ball, the prevailing metaphor for law today is "law as 
bulwark of freedom." Though this metaphor has inspired protection of minority rights, it 
also underwrites laws that are firm, hard, unmoving, brutal—guaranteeing justice and 
equality only when law has been established with total authority. Seeing law as the 
medium of social relationships is better, Ball argues; law is a time-bound management 
of and coping with ineradicable features of human life.119 
While Berman anticipated many of the themes in what we have called the 
“rhetorical-humanistic” school of law and language, represented by White and Ball, 
many scholars in this field today rely on literary analysis and critical theory which goes 
far beyond anything Berman found interesting.120 What is lacking is the foundation in 
linguistics that Berman was careful to lay. This has led many critics, including federal 
Judges Richard Posner and Harry Edwards to question the merit of this school of the 
law and language movement.121 The ability of Berman to integrate the meaningful goals 
of the rhetorical-humanist movement with the scientific basis of contemporary linguistics 
suggests that there may still be common ground to be found between the economists, 
linguists, and literary theorists. As Posner himself has suggested, the legal academy 
cannot do without “the methods of scientific and humanistic inquiry” which “enlarge our 
knowledge of the legal system” as a whole.122 
The second contemporary school of law and language that has emerged since 
Berman’s seminal tract of 1964 can be termed the “linguist school.” Lawyer-linguists 
Peter Tiersma and Lawrence Solan are exemplary; they have done much to show the 
contemporary relevance of linguistics to legal scholarship, especially in a time when 
textualism is a dominant method of statutory interpretation. Their co-edited Oxford 
Handbook of Law and Language is notable for its breadth of coverage in terms of theory 
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and contemporary concrete issues.123 Solan’s two monographs, The Language of 
Judges and The Language of Statutes offer expert linguistic analyses of the 
grammatical canons applied in judicial and statutory reasoning.124 Solan ultimately 
concludes that, while linguistic analysis is helpful in some circumstances of legal 
ambiguity, ultimately, judges and politicians have to make political judgments. Candor 
about the ultimate ambiguities at the heart of language would be better for the legal 
system than strained linguistic analysis. Vagueness, indeterminacy, and ambiguity are 
critical issues for many philosophers of law as well.  
Much contemporary work on law and language within the “linguistic school” is 
done to improve the conduct of trials before juries. The “plain language” movement has 
been an American echo of Bentham’s original cry for clarity in legal vocabulary, later 
echoed by Mellinkoff. The basic goal of the movement is to form legal language that 
quickly and easily allows readers to understand and act based on the text; the text 
should be as simple as the complexity of the ideas permits.125 According to Mark Adler, 
plain language is: 1) more precise, 2) less erroneous, 3) less expensive and more 
efficient, because lawyers do not have to translate legalese for their clients, 4) more 
persuasive by virtue of being easily understood, 5) more democratic and accessible, 
and 6) less tedious, more elegant, and more pleasant to use.126  
This plain language movement goes beyond what Berman called for in Law and 
Language.  Yes, Berman did argue that, especially in contexts where laypeople must 
understand the laws that apply to them, legal language should be clear, and lawyers 
and judges must work to translate the law into terms that laymen, even children, 
understand.127 But Berman, like Milner Ball later on, focused further on the critical role 
of courtroom liturgy, pageantry, and ornate formal language to underscore the majesty, 
the justice-making power of the law.128 Modern legal linguists may disagree with the 
latter accent.  As Gail Stygall notes, courtroom discourse, though highly predictable if 
understood, is at a distance from ordinary language. This makes the trial itself, as well 
as the law writ large, incomprehensible to most laypeople. Given the importance of 
language in legal proceedings, Stygall argues, the trial should be positioned closer to 
ordinary language, or better explanations of the process should be given to citizens, at 
the risk of delegitimizing the court.129 These problems in the courtroom can present 
problems for Berman’s communicative account of law and legal language, if legal 
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language actually ends up alienating most of the community, rather than gathering it 
together and representing its basic norms and mores. 
Translation has long been a critical issue for Berman, though he does not include 
detailed analyses of concrete problems of translation in his Law and Language.  
Nevertheless, Berman’s view of law and language, as a communifying practice oriented 
towards shared experience, has a concrete example in European Union legislators and 
courts. As these institutional bodies struggle to adopt common legal standards amidst a 
plurality of languages, modern linguists have wondered whether a common legal 
language is possible. Shared experience may indeed be a basis for a unified law of the 
European Union.130 “Strong” language theorists reject this possibility, but “weak” 
language theorists, who emphasize the flexibility of language, suggest that language 
meaning can be shared across tongues and stabilized through common experience and 
dialogue.131 The practice of EU legislators—writing without a source language, in a 
collaborative process of translation across each of the primary languages—is seeking 
the balance between a hegemony of a single legal language, and an incoherent mess of 
every European tongue having equal currency.132 
The EU faces another problem in the development of a new “Court French” 
among the clerks of the European Court of Justice. As Karen McAuliffe warns, the use 
of French by the court, coupled with the judicial clerks and law clerks who are not native 
French speakers, has led to a highly formalized version of “Court French,” which 
obstructs simplicity and creativity, but allows for easy translation of opinions into the 23 
official languages of the EU. The lawyer-linguists responsible for translating ECJ law 
must master two disciplines, since their work is comparative law as much as 
translation.133 
Nevertheless, facing this situation, Lawrence Solan is optimistic. Using a 
theological analogy that may have pleased Berman, Solan suggests that the 
proliferation of languages in the European Union may end up helping the European 
Court of Justice discover the meaning of a common legal text by helping the justices 
“triangulate” the meaning when there is no “original” text. This is an “Augustinian” 
approach to legal interpretation, as Saint Augustine compared translations of the Bible 
to ascertain its “true” meaning. If there is a common “original” meaning amidst the 
various versions, multiple legal texts will help the ECJ ascertain the shades of legal 
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meaning in a text. Solan is hopeful that as citizens in the EU have more, common 
experiences, the divergence in shades of meaning can be overcome.134 
Conclusions  
Berman understood that he was up to something very new and very controversial 
in his little volume on Law and Language.  He was calling for a new understanding of 
law, language, and history that he thought would bring community and peace to a world 
torn asunder—by World Wars, the Korean War, the Cold War, and the Vietnam War, by 
the violent student riots and union strikes at home, by the savage Marxist and critical 
scholarly attacks on churches, states, and economies, on traditions, canons, and 
cultures alike.  Many at the time would have viewed this argument as a fool’s errand. 
Perhaps that reality, as much as his incessant busyness, was what kept Berman from 
finishing and publishing this book. “I shall no doubt be scorned or ignored,” he 
confessed to his mentor Rosenstock-Huessy two years after completing the preliminary 
manuscript of this book.135 He had the same trepidation ten years later in publishing his 
equally novel and equally controversial little book, The Interaction of Law and Religion. 
To his last days, he was smarting that his Harvard Law School colleagues just ignored 
his law and religion book.136 
The Interaction of Law and Religion, however, helped to launch the modern law 
and religion movement, now embracing several hundred law professors in North 
America and Europe alone, with dozens of centers, programs, journals, and 
associations around the world.137  While Berman’s Law and Language manuscript, 
unpublished and largely unknown, obviously did not have the same catalytic and 
generative effect, the field of law and language studies, and related fields of legal 
translation and legal interpretation (hermeneutics, semiotics, and philology), have 
certainly blossomed in the half century since Berman’s wrote this early work.  At 
minimum, Berman’s little book can be viewed as an interesting artifact, even a missing 
link, in the evolution of the field of law and language studies.  But even more, it can be 
viewed as a profound prophetic example and call for deep legal scholarship that is at 
once rigorously interdisciplinary, international, and intercultural in reach and ambition, 
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and that is resolutely directed toward greater understanding of the “weightier matters of 
the law: justice and mercy and faith.”138  
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